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In the Supreme Co~rt 
of the State of Utah 
CANADA DRY BOTTLING COM-
PANY OF UTAH and McCUL-
L 0 U G H RECREATION COM-
P ANY, Utah corporations, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW, INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISS~ON OF UTAH, DE-
PARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, Defendant. 
Case No. 7389 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 28, 1948, a representative of. the Department 
of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
issued a determination directed to the Canada Dry Bottling 
Company of Utah, . Inc. holding that the Canada Dry Bottling 
Company did not acquire all or substantially all of the assets 
of the partnership, The R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, 
and that, therefore, the said Canada Dry Bottling Company 
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was not a "qualified employer" within the meaning of Section 
· 42-2a-7 (c) ( 1) (C), Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended 
by Chapter 56,. Laws of Utah 1947. 
On the same date a similar determination was addressed 
to the McCullough Recreation Company. On November 4, 
1948, formal appeals were filed in behalf of both the Canada 
Dry Bottling Company corporation and the McCullough 
Recreation Company corporation. The matter was duly heard 
before the Appeals Referee, who rendered his decision on July 
20, 1949. His decision upheld the determination of the rep-
resentative. 
On July 28, 1949, the decision of the Appeals Referee 
was appealed to the Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah under the provisions of Section 42-2a-10, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 53, Laws 
of Utah, 1949. On the 17th day of August, 1949; the Board 
of Review denied any further hearing and thereby sustained 
the decision of the Appeals Referee and the representative. 
The matter is now before this court by virtue of a Petition 
for Writ of Review dated August 26, 1949. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, a general partner-
ship for more than three years prior to January 1, 1947, operated 
the Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah, the Temple Bowl-
ing Alleys, Ritz Bowling Palace, and Ogden Bowling Center. 
Each of these operations had its separate records, bank accounts 
and personnel. The profits, when determined, were deposited 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in a profit account in the general partnership, the R. Verne 
McCullough Enterprises, for the purpose of distribution to 
the partners. 
On or about July 1, 1947, a Utah corporation known as 
the McCullough Recreation Company was formed and to it 
were transferred the operating assets of Temple Bowling Alleys, 
Ritz Bowling Palace, and Ogden Bowling Center. The stock-
holders in the corporation were the partners of the general 
partnership, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, ·and were 
issued stock in the same amounts and proportions as were their 
interests in the general partnership. 
On or about July 1, 1947, a Utah corporation was or-
ganized under the name of Canada Dry Bottling, Company 
of Utah. This corporation acquired all o~ the operating assets 
of that part of the general partnership enterprise known as 
the Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah. Again, the stock-
holders of the corporation were the partners of the general 
partnership, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, and held 
stock in proportion to their previous partnership interests. 
It may be admitted for all purposes of the question at issue 
that the general partnership, the R. Verne McCullough Enter-
prises, discontinued operations as of the date of the transfer 
to the corporations. The situation may be very simply stated 
in that each of the corporations which were· formed on or about 
July 1, 1947, obtained a substantial and considerable part of 
the assets of the general partnership, the R. Verne McCullough 
Enterprises, and consequently, therefore, that neither of the 
corporations acquired all or substantially all of the assets of 
the general partnership, the R. Verne McCullough E~terprises. 
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DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT 
NEITHER THE CANADA DRY BOTTLING COM-
PANY OF UTAH, A CORPORATION, NOR THE Mc-
CULLOUGH RECREATION COMPANY, A CORPORA-
TION, WERE HQUALIFIED EMPLOYERS" WITHIN THE 
MEANNG OF THE UTAH ACT ON JANUARY 1, 1947, 
SINCE NEITHER ACQUIRED ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY 
ALL THE ASSETS OF THE PREDECESSOR EMPLOYER, 
THE R. VERNE McCULLOUGH ENTERPRISES. 
For some years prior to 1947 the Utah Employment Security 
Act, Chapter 42-2a, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, 
contained no provision for reduced rates for employers "for the 
purpose of paying unemployment compensation contributions. 
The Act merely provided as follows: 
Section 42-2a-7(b) (2), Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
cc (b) (2) Each employer shall pay contributions 
equal to 2. 7 percent of wages paid by him during the 
calendar year 1941 and durirtg each calendar year there-
after with respect to employment occurring after De-
cember 31, 1940." 
Section 7 of the Act provided for a study of experience 
rating. 
The 1947 legislature enacted Chapter 56, Laws of Utah, 
1947, providing two employer experience rating formulre. 
Section 42-2a-7(b) was amended by adding: 
cc ( 3) Each employer shall, except as provided in sub-
section (c) of this section, pay contributions equal to 
2.7 percent of wages paid by him during the calendar 
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years or portion thereof occurring after June 30, 1947, 
and prior to January 1, 1950. 
\\ ( 4) Each employer shall, except as provided in sub-
section (d) of this section, pay contributions equal to 
2.7 percent of the wages paid by him during each of the 
calendar years occurring after December 31, 1949." 
The court's attention is called to the fact that ( 3) above 
quoted provides for a _system of rates for the period commenc-
ing July 1, 1947, and ending December 31, 1949, and that ( 4) 
provides for a system of rating to go into effect for the years 
after December 31, 1949. The court's attention is called to 
Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1949, which, among other things, 
amended Section 42-2a-7 by changing the above quoted para-
graph (3) of subsection (b) to read as follows: 
t \ ( 3) Each em player shall, except as provided· in 
subsection (c) of this· section, pay contributions equal 
to 2. 7 percent of wages paid by him during the calendar 
years or portion thereof occurring after June 30, 1947." 
Paragraph ( 4) above quoted was deleted from the section 
so that the system of rates, successorship, etc., which was 
previously provided to take effect January 1, 1950, was deleted 
from the Act, and the system as established in subsection (c) , 
with some amendments, remains in effect after December 31, 
1949. The Act, therefore, establishes a standard rate for the 
payment of contributions, ( 3) set out above, equal to 2. 7 
percent of wages. 
Section 42-2~-7 (c), Utah Code Annotated 1943, as 
amended by Chapter 56, Laws of Utah, 194 7, established a 
formula whereby ((qualified employers" who met certain con-
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ditions set forth there would pay a rate less than 2. 7 percent. 
(c) ( 1) (C) defined qualified employer as: 
tt (C) 'Qualified employer' means any employer who: 
was an employer as defined in this act during each of 
the thirteen consecutive calendar quarters immediately 
preceding the computation date; and had employment 
in each of the three completed calendar years im-
mediately preceding the computation date; and with 
respect to such three calendar years had filed all con-
tribution reports prescribed by the Commission; and 
(except for amounts due as determined pursuant to 
audit or as set forth on a notice of contribution de-
ficiency prepared by the Commission and pertaining 
to the quarter ending December 31 immediately pre-
ceding the computation date) had paid all contributions 
thereon by the cut-off date. If an employer has acquired 
all or substantially all the assets of another employer 
and such other employer had discontinued operations 
upon such acquisition, the period of liability of both 
employers during such period shall be jointly considered_ 
for all purposes of this section." 
We find, therefore, that in order to have been classified 
as a uqualified employer" so that the experience raing formula 
would be applied as of July 1, 1947-the first rate reduction 
applying only to the last six months Qf 1947-any employer 
must ( 1) have been an employer as defined in the Act during 
each of the 13 consecutive calendar quarters immediately 
preceding the computation date (the first computation date 
being January 1, 1947); (2) the employer must have had em-
ployment in each of the three completed calendar years im-
mediately preceding the computation date; (3) the employer 
with respect to such three calendar years must have filed all 
contribution reports prescribed by the Commission; and ( 4) 
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the employer must have paid all contributions thereon by the 
cut-off date ( n (cut-off date' n1eans April 30 with respect to 
contribution rates effective for the period July 1, 1947, to 
December 31, 1947, and thereafter February 15 next following 
the computation date,). 
Or in the case where an employer acquired all or substan-
tially all the assets o£ another employer, the period of liability 
of both employers during the 13 consecutive calendar quarters 
preceding the computation date, would be jointly considered 
for all purposes of Section 7 provided it was shown that the 
predecessor employer had discontinued operations upon such 
acquisition. 
It can be admitted that had the R. Verne McCullough 
Enterprises, the general partnership, continued operations 
during the rate period which commenced July 1, 1947, it 
would have been a qualified employer and therefore would 
have been entitled to a reduced rate computed on the basis of 
the formula set out in the statute. (It is unnecessary to discuss 
the formula inasmuch as the question of the method of its 
application is not in issue in this matter. It appears to be 
sufficient to state that rates are computed upon the basis of 
the percentage decrease of annual payrolls over the 3-year 
period; the percentage decrease of quarterly payrolls over the 
3-year period; and the length of time the employer was subject 
to the Act). 
As in most cases where several distinct operating units 
having their own records and payrolls were being operated by 
one ownership, the general partnership operating units, the 
Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah, Temple Bowling 
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Alleys, Ritz Bowling Palace, and Ogden Bowling· Center were 
reported under teA" and tcB" accounts as follows: 
The Temple Bowling Alleys, Ritz Bowling Palace, and 
Ogden Bowling Center were reported under an teA" account 
entitled R. Verne McCullough, et·al, dba R. Verne McCullough 
Enterprises, and the Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah 
filed reports under a ~~B" account with the title R. Verne Mc-
Cullough, et al. dba. Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah . 
. Had the general partnership continued operating during 
the rate period commencing July 1, 1947, the total wages of all 
of the operating units would have been combined and used in a 
rate compu_tation in the manner set forth in Department's 
Exhibit 5. Department's Exhibit 3 and 4 are computations 
of rates which would have been applied to the two successor 
corporations had they been ((qualified employers" within the 
meaning of the above-quoted subsection (c) . The method 
of computing rates is set forth in Department's Exhibit 2. 
The computations as shown on the above-mentioned ex-
hibits were made at the request of the appellants to determine 
what rate would have been attributable to the general partner-
ship, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, had it continued 
operating after July 1, 1947, and what rate would have been 
contributed to each of the two corporations had they been held 
to be ((qualified employers." Under the ruling of the Depart-
ment there had not been, prior to the date of the hearing in 
this matter before the Referee, any rate computations affecting 
these parties. 
Some 38 states have passed statutes providing for the 
transfer of merit rating to successors in certain cases. Of these, 
10 
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4 states have provided that an acquisition "of all or a part 
thereof" was sufficient to establish successorship; 13 states 
require an acquisition of Hsubstantially all"; and 18 states 
allow successorship ·only if the trade, business, or nall" of the 
assets of the predecessor were acquired. 
The 1949 Legislature, Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1949, 
added to the above-quoted subsection ( 7) (c) the following 
language: 
ttl£ an employer has acquired a clearly segregable 
and identifiable part of another employer's enterprise, 
the period of liability attributable to such transferred 
part of an employers' enterprise shall be considered 
jointly with the period of liability of the acquiring 
em player for_ all purposes of _this section, provided, that 
the acquiring employer's rate for the period beginning 
with the date of the transfer and ending with the next 
following effective date of contribution rates shall be 
that rate which is assigned pursuant to the regulations 
of the Commission adopted under the provisions of 
this section, which provide for the transfer of a rate 
by an employer to his successor. 
ttAn employer who transfers all or a segregable part 
of his operations from another state to this state shall 
be deemed to be a tqualified employer' within the 
meaning of this section as of the computation date 
next following the transfer, provided: that he has paid 
wages subject to the federal unemployment tax act for 
twelve consecutive completed calendar quarters im-
meditely preceding the computation date; that he 
notifies the commission of the transfer of operations 
prior to the computation date; that he certifies to the 
Commission all information with respect to the trans-
ferred operations v;hich the Commission determines 
to be necessary. (Wages,' paid in connection with such 
11 
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transferred operations shall be deemed to have been 
paid in this state for the purposes of this section." 
There can be no validity, however, in an argument that 
this 1949 amendment was retroactive to July 1, 1947, and 
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 3rd Judicial 
Department, on December 29, 1948, so held, in effect when 
interpreting a similar amendment in ~he case of the News-
paper P.M., Inc., Marshall Field and Marshall Field, Jr., indi-
vidually, doing business as Field Publications vs. Edward Corsi, 
Industrial Commissioner (CCH N.Y. ~aragraph 8520.) The 
court stated: 
ttPrior to 1947 the requirements for qualification for 
credit made no provision for and did not include an 
employer's discontinuance of operations upon his dis-
posal and another's consequent acquisition of a sever-
able part of his business activities. That the equity 
and fairness of so doing was recently recognized and 
provided for (quoting New York Court, changes) 
does not Fermit us to make that measure retroactive. 
To uphold appellant's contention we would, in effect, 
be doing that. The liberal construction contended for 
would register the legislative grant of a new right 
superfluous. The remedial nature of a new right be-
stowed affords it no retroactive reach. (Jacobus vs. 
Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235) ." 
The court held that Mr. Field, when he disposed of his 
P.M. Newspaper business to the Field Publications and con-
tinued m the newspaper business of publishing the Chicago 
Sun, and in connection therewith, continued in New York 
City the maintenance of a news gathering and transmitting 
organization, -did not discontinue operations within the meaning 
of the applicable statute in 1942, the date of the transfer. 
12 
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We again call this court's attention to the fact that the 
1947 Utah statute contained a similar provision that a successor 
could not succeed to the experience of the predecessor unless 
"such other employer had discontinued operations upon such 
acquisition." (Sec. (7) (c).) It is our position that the Utah 
statute establishes a standard rate of contributions of 2. 7 per-
cent and that it is a well-settled principle of law that in order 
. to take advantage of a statutory provision (for any reduction 
in rate) the employer must prove to the satisfaction of the 
administering body that it has met all of the statutory specifi-
cations. The statute is to be construed as written, having in 
mind its evident purpose, whether the end result is considered 
by some to be economically good or bad. 
The statute, as it existed on July 1, 1947, was an integral 
part of the statute just as is the 1949 amendment permitting 
the transfer of merit rating in the case where an employer 
acquires a clearly segregable and identifiable part of another 
employer's enterprise. (55 Yale L. J. 218, 242). Also, there 
can be no merit to the argument that the Canada Dry Bottling -
Company of Utah prior to its incorporation was a separate 
employing unit or that the units which became incorporated 
under the name McCullough Recreation Company were sepa-
rate employing units. 
Section 42-2a-19, Utah Code Annotated 1943, defines 
employing unit as follows: 
u (h) (Employing unit' means any individual or type 
of organization, including any partnership, association, 
trust, estate, joint stock company, insurance company 
or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, or the 
receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or successor 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of any ·of the foregoing, or the legal representative 
of a deceased person, which has or subsequent to 
January 1, 1935, had one or pJore individuals perform-
ing services for it ·within this state. 
( c ( 1) All individuals performing services within this 
· state for any employing unit which maintains two or 
more separate establishments within this state shall 
be deemed to be performing services for a single 
employing unit for all the purposes of this act. 
n ( 2) Each individual employed to perform or to 
assist in performing the work of any person in the 
service of an employing unit shall be deemed to be 
engaged by such employing unit for all the purposes 
of this act whether such individual was hired or paid 
directly by such employing unit or by such person, 
provided the employing unit had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the work." 
Although this employer was allowed to file separate 
reports for the different operating units, it was but one employ-
ing unit within the meaning of the above-quoted secti9n, that 
unit being the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, the general 
partnership. As set forth in the above-quoted section, all of 
the individuals performing services in the two or more separate 
~~tablishments were deemed to be performing services for 
the same employing unit, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises. 
4ny rate computations which would have been made would 
ha:ve -been made on the basis of the combined payrolls of the 
separate operating units . 
.-. ;_ The New Hampshire Employment .Security Act prior 
t9. April _30; 1945, contained no provision for the transfer of 
experience rating, but effective April 30, 1945, the law was 
am~nded to permit a transfer of rates. In the case of C. A. 
14 
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Lund & Company vs. Rolfe, 93 N. H. 280, 41 A. (2d) 226 
( 1945) , dealing with the period prior to the amendment, 
which became effective April 30, 1945, the court held that 
a partnership which took over the business of the corporation 
was not entitled to the merit rating record of the corporation 
for purposes of computing the partnership's unemployment 
compensation contribution rate even though the members of 
the partnership consisted of 4 of the 6 stockholders of the 
former corporation and no change in personnel or type of 
business conducted took place at the time the partnership 
took over the business of the corporation. 
The New Hampshire court further held, in the case of 
Sulloway, et al vs. Rolfe, 47 A. (2d) 109 (1946), that where 
a member of a partnership died and was replaced by a new 
member, a new employing unit was thereby created and there-
.fore such employing unit was not entitled to pay unemployment 
compensation contributions at a rate based upon the combined 
experience of it and its predecessor even though the partner 
had agreed that irt the event of death or resignation of any 
partner, the remaining partners would continue the practice 
of law together as partners and that the partnership should 
not terminate because of such death or resignation. 
In the case of Seavey Hardware Company vs. Riley, 95 
N. H .... , 67 A. (2d) 430, decided June 28, 1949, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court held that a purchaser of one of 
two hardware stores owned by a partnership was not entitled 
to the merit rating of the partnership under the Unemployment 
Compensation Law since the store purchased did not con-
stitute substantially all of the assets of the partnership. The 
15' 
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court overruled the contention that the partnership comprised 
two employing units and that each of them was an employer 
under the law ... In answer to the contention of the plaintiff that 
the partnership comprised two employing units, one the Seavey 
Hardware Company, and the other Young's Hardware Store, 
and that each of these units was itself an ctemployer" under 
the Act, the court said: 
nThis argument ignores the express provision con-
tained in subsection 1-G: (All individuals performing 
services within this state for any employing unit which 
· maintains two or more separate establishments within-
the state shall be deemed to be employed by a single 
employing unit for all purposes of this chapter.' The 
Fountain partnership, although it had two sepa~ate 
stores or establishments in Dover and Exeter re-
spectively, was a single employing unit and so one 
employer. Cartersville Candlewick vs. Huiet, 50 S. E. 
( 2d) (Ga.) 647. It is clear that the terms of subsection 
1-G in the definition of an employing unit expressly 
include a partnership and neither expressly nor by 
implication refer to a store in and of itself as an em-
ploying unit. The Dover store itself was not an em-
ploying unit or employer within the meaning of the 
Act -and had no merit rating that could be acquired 
by Thomas C. Dunnington. 
nThe plaintiff's position is fallacious in stating that 
the Seavey Hardv1are Company was one employing 
unit and that the other was Young's Hardware Store. 
Employing unit is defined in terms of the individual or 
type of organization behind a trade or business rather 
than in terms of the physical units and the economic 
features of the enterprise. In Sulloway vs. Rolfe, 
supra, 87, the theory that an employing unit was the 
same because the organization of a certain law office 
was the same and it was fair to say that there was iden-
16 
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tity of enterprise and other business and economic 
factors, was rejected. It was held that since there was 
a change in the personnel of the partnership, the em-
ploying unit was new and that under the statute as 
it then was, the new partnership was not entitled to 
the merit rating of the predecessor. So, in the present 
case the contention that the Dover Store was an em-
ploying unit, cannot be accepted. The employing unit 
was the Fountain partnership, which also owned the 
store in Exeter.. It has sometimes been stated that the 
phrase (employing unit' is defined in terms of the 
venturer rather than of the venture. By employing 
unit is meant the master rather than the servants, the 
owner rather than the business, the one ultimately 
liable for the obligations of the organizations. 
ttThe claim of the plaintiff that the defendant (should 
have divided Fountain's account into two sections, one 
applicable to each establishment,' is error. The statute 
provides for a separate account for each employer and 
accordingly for a separate rating for each . . . These 
merit rating accounts are not severable, nor can a part 
of the trccount of the transferor be carried forward by 
the successor. Cartersville Candlewick vs. Huiet, supra; 
Ned's Auto Supply ·company vs. Commission, 313 
Mich. 66; El Queeno Distributing Company vs. 
Christgau, 221 Minn. 197. The accounts and ratings 
cannot be multiplied to correspond to the severable 
portions of an employer's organization, trade, or busi-
ness, either during his ownership or at the time of 
acquisition of a portion by another or others. If the 
requirements of subsection 6-F are complied with, the 
successor gains the merit rating of the transferor. 
Otherwise, he gets no such rating with his transfer. 
The Act does not contemplate the great burden that 
would be cast upon the defendant by holding that 
accounts should correspond to establishments rather 
than to employers. Also, no provision is made for 
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dividing a merit rating at the time of the acquisition 
of a part of the assets of an employer so that two shall 
. be created out of the one that existed . . . For each 
business, account and merit rating, there is but one 
.employer although he may operate more than one 
establishment; for each employer, only one set of 
contributions as required." 
(The court then proceeded to set out the definition of 
employing unit, which corresponds to the definition of em-
ploying unit in the Utah ~ct). 
Similarly, under the Utah Act, there is in the instant case 
only a single employer, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, 
a gen~ral partnership, which, until the time of the incorporation 
_on or about July 1, 1947, had one account and one merit rate 
(or would have had a merit rate had it continued in operation 
after July 1, 1947). 
It is a matter of historical record that Section ( 7) (c) of 
the statute, and particularly that portion defining a ((qualified 
employer," hereinabove quoted, was copied verbatim from 
the New Yotk statute as it existed at the time of the 1947 
legislative amendment. It is also true that since the Utah 
statute established a method of reduced rates for employers 
a number of years after most of the other states had expet.~.enced 
a rate reduction, we are compelled to rely upon decisions of 
those other states in interpreting similar provisions in the Utah 
Act. The New York Act provided: 
HI£ an employer has acquired all or substantially all 
the assets of another employer and such other employer 
has discontinued operations on such acquisition, the 
period of liability of both employers during such period 
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shall be jointly considered for all purposes of this 
section.'' 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division 3rd 
Department, 275, Appellate Division 881, decided May 4, 
1949, held that a corporation which was engaged in the manu-
facture of radio and telephone parts and which operated a labor-
atory and a patent division in connection therewith and which 
transferred to one of its subsidiaries all of the assets used in con-
nection 'vith its laboratory division and retained the assets used 
in connection with its patent division was held not entitled to 
transfer its contribution rate to such successor. Although the 
corporation transferred substantially all of its assets, it failed 
to discontinue business operations and thus failed to comply 
with at least one condition necessary to permit the transfer 
of its rate credit. The court said: 
tt ••• The legislature did not intend to authorize the 
transfer of credits allowed to a qualified employer to 
anyone except his successor in business who had ac-
quired all or substantially all of his assets, and then 
only if the qualified employer had ceased all business 
operations." 
So that this court rna y understand the term 't transfer of 
credits," the New York statute sets up a procedure whereby 
at the end of a rate year the employer is given a credit or cash 
refund which will, of course, be applied on future contribu-
tions, etc. The Utah Act does not provide for extra credits. 
It provides that in the succeeding year the qualified employer 
will pay a rate less than 2.7 percent. So also did the New 
York court rule in the case of the Matter of the Application 
for a Contribution Rate Credit Under Section 577 of the 
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Unemployment Insurance Law· by Hinzmann and Waldmann, 
Inc., .Appellant vs. Edward Corsi, Industrial Commissioner, 
decided December 29, 1948, 274 App. Div. 1009. In this 
case the court decided that the appellant, one of two corpora-
tions formed to take the business of a partnership,. did not 
acquire substantially all of the assets of the former partnership 
venture where the total assets of the partnership at the time 
of the transfer were $523,117.89 and the appellant acquired 
only. $129,938.98, and therefore that the appellant was not 
entitled to a tax credit for the year in which the transfer took 
place. The only question which was presented in that case 
was the one as to whether or not the appellant was a ((qualified 
employer" as defined in the New York Act. Briefly, the facts 
were ·as follows: 
For some time prior to April, 1946, Albert 0. Hinzmann 
and Anton Waldmann, as co-partners, were engaged in business 
as joiners and woodworkers. In addition to that venture, the 
partners, commencing November, -1944, and continuing until 
April, 1946, engaged in the business of repairing ships. In 
April, 1946, the partners determined to incorporate their busi-
ness and form two corporations for that purpose. The appel-
lant· is one of the two corporations, and the partnership 
transferred to it that portion of the partnership assets carried 
on the partnership books as the woodworking assets. The 
portion of the business relating to the ship repairing was 
transferred to a corporation kno-yvn as the Hinzmann & Wald-
mann Marine Corporation. The section of the New York Law 
which was involved was the one hereinbefore set forth dealing 
with the acquisition of the assets of another employer. Hinz-
mann and Waldmann, Inc., filed a motion for leave to appeal 
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from the above decision. These defendants are advised by 
the State of New York that after consideration of the briefs 
filed pursuant to the motion for leave to appeal, the motion 
was denied. 
So, in the instant case, neither the Canada Dry Bottling 
Company of Utah, a corporation, nor the McCullough Recrea-
tion Company, a corporation, acquired substantially all of the 
assets of the general partnership, the R. Verne McCullough 
Enterprises, and neither did they acquire a rna jority of the 
assets. 
In a very recent case decided by the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court on November 1, 1949, Auclair Transportation, 
Inc., vs. William Riley, Comml.ssioner of Labor, it was held 
that a corporation which was formed to take over the business 
of a trucking company was not entitled to the predecessor. 
employer's reduced rate where substantially all of the predeces-
sor's assets were not transferred to the successor corporation. 
The court said: 
tcThe relation between the value of the trucking 
business transferred and the value of the gasoline sta-
tion retained is not so small from either an accounting 
or practical viewpoint that we can say as a matter of 
law that substantially all of the assets of the business 
. . . were acquired by the plaintiff.'' 
In the Auclair case the facts. were that W .. M. Auclair 
owned and operated a motor vehicle trucking business, doing 
business as W. M. Auclair Transportation, and also operated 
a gasoline station for the sale of gasoline and allied products. 
In the trucking business he employed approximately 25 persons, 
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and in the gasoline station he generally had 3 employees. The 
book value of the trucking business was set up at some $34,000 
and the book value of the gasoline station was set up at some 
$4,000. He transferred the trucking operation on January 1, 
1945, to the Auclair Transportation, Inc. He retained pos-
session and ownership of the gasoline station and continued 
·to operate the same. The court said: 
"The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff is 
·entitled to the employer merit rating of W. M. Auclair 
upon the transfer described in the agreed facts. The 
unemployment compensation statute provides that the 
· experience rating of an employer may be transferred 
to (an employing unit which acquires the organization, 
trade, or business, or substantially all the assets thereof 
ccw e are not concerned with the logical and economic 
questions for and against experience rating or merit 
rating as it is usually described in this state (55 Yale 
L. J. 218, 242) , since it is an integral part of the 
statute. Following the decisions in the Lund vs. Rolfe, 
93 N.H. 280, and Sulloway vs. Rolfe, 94 N.H. 85, 
the quoted statute also made the transfer of merit 
rating for unemployment compensation contribution to 
successor employing units (Note 60 Harv. L. Rev. 276) 
an integr~l part of the law." 
The court further said: 
C(The word (substantially' is merely an elastic term 
which does not indicate a definite fixed amount of 
percentage. At one extreme it may be said that the 
transfer does not have to be 100 percent; at the other 
extreme, it may be said that the transfer cannot be less 
than 90 percent in the ordinary situation. (See appli-
cation of Hinzmann & Waldmann, 85 N.Y. S. 149; 
Schul· Trading Company vs. Commission, 95 F. (2d) 
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404), although a lesser amount has been considered 
sufficient under a statute which is broader than ours. 
Harris vs. Egan, 135 Conn. 102; anno: 4 A. L. R. 2d 
721. The relation between the value of the trucking 
business transfer and the value of the gasoline station 
retained is not so small from either an accounting or 
practical viewpoint that we can say, as a matter of law, 
that substantially all of the assets of the business of 
W. M. Auclair were acquired by the plaintiff. The 
determination by the defendant that they were not is 
one that could be made upon the facts in this case." 
The plaintiffs, in their brief, (Page 18) refer to the case 
of Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. vs. Iowa Employment Security 
Commission ,Supreme Court of Iowa. An examination of the 
Iowa statute shows that the provision in question was as 
follows: 
Hb. In any case in which the enterprise or business for 
which contributions have been paid has been sold or 
otherwise transferred to a successor employing unit, 
or in any case in which one or more employing units 
have been reorganized or merged into a single employ-
ing unit and the successor employer continues to operate 
such enterprise, such successor employer shall assume 
the position of the predecessor employer or employers 
with respect to such predecessor's payrolls, contribu-
tions, accounts, and contribution rates to the same ex-
tent as if there had been no change in the ownership 
or control of such enterprise or business.'' 
It is noted that the Iowa statute differs materially from 
the Utah statute in that it is concerned primarily with whether 
or not the employing unit or units which were transferred are 
operated as a- single employing unit. The rationale behind 
the law can be readily understood since in that state the 
employer experience rate is based upon the amount of benefits 
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which are paid· to individuals formerly in its employ, which 
benefits are charged against -the employer's account. In cases 
where one ownership operates several units, the benefit-charges·· 
would have been made against the single ownership, and not 
agai11st . th_e individual employing units. Consequently, it 
would have been impossible for the Iowa Agency to have de-
termirted charges against individual units at a later date when 
such individual units might have been transf~rred to different 
successors; and therefore it would not have been possible to 
determine what rate should be applicable to an individual 
operating unit. 
So, too, under the Utah Act the legislature had in mind 
that an employing unit in Utah may have become subject to 
the Utah Act and have operated three or more years. This 
single ownership of a single operating unit may have acquired 
one or more new business units which had no operating experi-
·ence .. It can be easily seen, therefore, that upon segregation 
only the individual operating unit which had three or more 
ye~~s . of ~overage would have had sufficient expenence to 
comply_ with the three-year requirement. 
_It- will be noted that the Utah Act also carries a statutory 
requirement that no employer may obtain a rate less than 2.7 
percent (the standard rate) unless he had paid all contribu-
tions due and has filed all reports. The Pennsylvania statute 
COJ?,tains a ·similar provision, and the Court· of Common Pleas 
of Dauphin County (No. 2 Commonwealth Docket 1948) 
in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. Molnar 
Brothers Coal Company from the order of Department of 
Labor and Industry on the Application for Review and Re-
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adjustment of the Contribution Rate to the Unemployment 
Compensation Fund, decided March, 1949, that where the 
predecessor had not paid all contributions, the successor was 
not entitled to a reduced rate. The court said: 
HThe appellant does not deny its failure to comply 
with the provisions of the law, but attempts first to 
excuse its failure on the ground that the Bureau would 
not help it make out its returns until1947 and, secondly, 
contends that the provision of paragraph Ce' is in the 
nature of a penalty and as such is unreasonable and 
unlawful ... 
HWhere the appellant falls into error on its other 
contention is that the tax imposed by the statute is 2. 7 
percent and not the unknown and undetermined per-
cent which the appellant would be required to pay had 
it been entitled to an experience rating. 
uln Albright Unemployment Compensation case, 162 
Pa. Superior Ct. 98, 104 ( 1948) Judge Arnold said: 
(Prior to 1943 intervenor's tax was 2. 7DJo. uExperi-
ence rating'' effected, according to a formula, and 
adjustment of the contribution, which reduced this 
rate, the reduction to become greater as the ccunem-
ployment'' of the employer's workmen became less. 
It was a reward and not a penalty, for without ccex-
perience rating" the employer's tax would remain at 
2.7DJo, and in the subsequent amendments of 1943 
and 1945 its tax was fixed at this rate unless ad-
justed.' 
"As pointed out above the tax is 2.7DJo unless the tax-
payer meets certain requirements among which is the 
payment of all contributions prior to certain prescribed 
dates which the appellant did not do. 
uBeing ca reward and not a penalty' the principles 
relating to penalties urged upon us by the appellant 
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do not apply. The rate was properly set by the Bureau 
for 1947 at 2. 70jo." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the defendants in the instant case contend 
that the plaintiffs have not met the statutory requirements for 
the payment of a rate less than 2.7 percent-the standard rate 
established by the statute-and that, therefore, their rate for 
the period involved in this matter must remain at 2. 7 percent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN, Special 
Assistant Attorney General 
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